

Paper reference 20158K
Pearson BTEC Level 3
Nationals Diploma,
Extended Diploma

Information Technology
UNIT 11: Cyber Security and Incident
Management
(Part B)

Window for supervised period:
Monday 24 April 2023 – Monday 15 May 2023
Supervised hours: 4 hours

**THIS BOOKLET SHOULD NOT BE
RETURNED TO PEARSON.**

X70536A

YOU MUST HAVE:

Forensic_Analysis.rtf

YOU WILL BE GIVEN

Data Book.

INSTRUCTIONS

- **Part A and Part B** contain material for the completion of the set tasks under supervised conditions.
- There are 43 marks for **Part A** and 37 marks for **Part B**, giving a total mark for the set tasks of 80.
- **Part A and Part B** are specific to each series and this material must be issued only to learners who have been entered to take the tasks in the specified series.
- Learners **MUST ONLY** have access to **Part B** during the supervised assessment period.
- This booklet should be kept securely until the start of the 4 – hour, **Part B** supervised assessment period.
- **Part A** will need to have been completed and kept securely before starting **Part B**.

(continued on the next page)

Turn over

INSTRUCTIONS continued

- **Part A** materials must not be accessed during the completion of **Part B**.
- Both parts will need to be completed during the 3 – week period timetabled by Pearson.
- **Part A** and **Part B** tasks must be submitted together for each learner.
- This booklet should not be returned to Pearson.
- Answer ALL activities.

INFORMATION

- The total mark for this Part is 37.
-

INSTRUCTIONS TO INVIGILATORS

This paper must be read in conjunction with the unit information in the specification and the **BTEC Nationals Instructions for Conducting External Assessments (ICEA)** document.

See the Pearson website for details.

Refer carefully to the instructions in this task booklet and the **BTEC Nationals Instructions for Conducting External Assessments (ICEA)** document to ensure that the assessment is supervised correctly.

Part A and **Part B** set tasks should be completed during the period of 3 weeks timetabled by Pearson. **Part A** must be completed before starting **Part B**.

The 4 – hour **Part B** set task must be carried out under supervised conditions.

The set task can be undertaken in more than one supervised session.

(continued on the next page)

INSTRUCTIONS TO INVIGILATORS continued

An electronic template for activity 4 is available on the website for centres to download for learner use.

Learners must complete this task on a computer using the templates provided and appropriate software.

All work must be saved as PDF documents for submission.

Invigilators may clarify the wording that appears in this task but cannot provide any guidance in completion of the task.

Invigilators should note that they are responsible for maintaining security and for reporting issues to Pearson.

(continued on the next page)

INSTRUCTIONS TO INVIGILATORS continued

MAINTAINING SECURITY

- **Learners must not bring anything into the supervised environment or take anything out.**
- **Centres are responsible for putting in place appropriate checks to ensure that only permitted material is introduced into the supervised environment.**
- **Internet access is not permitted.**
- **Learners' work must be regularly backed up.**
Learners should save their work to their folder using the naming instructions indicated in each activity.
- **During any permitted break, and at the end of the session, materials must be kept securely, and no items removed from the supervised environment.**
- **Learners can only access their work under supervision.**
- **User areas must only be accessible to the individual learners and to named members of staff.**

(continued on the next page)

Turn over

INSTRUCTIONS TO INVIGILATORS continued

- Any materials being used by learners must be collected in at the end of each session, stored securely and handed back at the beginning of the next session.
- Following completion of **Part B**, all materials must be retained securely for submission to Pearson.
- **Part A** materials must not be accessed during the completion of **Part B**.

(continued on the next page)

INSTRUCTIONS TO INVIGILATORS continued**OUTCOMES FOR SUBMISSION**

Each learner must create a folder to submit their work.

The folder should be named according to this naming convention:

**[Centre #]_[Registration number #]_
[surname]_[first letter of first name]_U11B**

Example: **Joshua Smith** with registration number **F180542** at centre **12345** would have a folder titled **12345_F180542_Smith_J_U11B**

Each learner will need to submit 2 PDF documents within their folder.

The 2 PDF documents should use these file names:

ACTIVITY 4:

activity4_incidentanalysis_[Registration number #]_[surname]_[first letter of first name]

(continued on the next page)

INSTRUCTIONS TO INVIGILATORS continued

ACTIVITY 5:

**activity5_securityreport_[Registration
number #]_[surname]_[first letter of first name]**

**An authentication sheet must be completed by each
learner and submitted with the final outcomes.**

**The work should be submitted no later than
15 May 2023.**

INSTRUCTIONS FOR LEARNERS

Read the set task information carefully.

Plan your time carefully to allow for the preparation and completion of all the activities.

Your centre will advise you of the timing for the supervised period. It is likely that you will be given more than one timetabled session to complete these tasks.

Internet access is NOT allowed.

You will complete this set task under supervision and your work will be kept securely at all times.

You must work independently throughout the supervised assessment period and must not share your work with other learners.

Your invigilator may clarify the wording that appears in this task but cannot provide any guidance in completion of the activities.

Part A materials must not be accessed during the completion of Part B.

(continued on the next page)

Turn over

INSTRUCTIONS FOR LEARNERS continued

OUTCOMES FOR SUBMISSION

You must create a folder to submit your work.

The folder should be named according to this naming convention:

**[Centre #]_[Registration number #]_
[surname]_[first letter of first name]_U11B**

Example: Joshua Smith with registration number F180542 at centre 12345 would have a folder titled

12345_F180542_Smith_J_U11B

You will need to submit 2 PDF documents within this folder.

The 2 PDF documents should use these file names:

ACTIVITY 4:

activity4_incidentanalysis_[Registration number #]_[surname]_[first letter of first name]

(continued on the next page)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR LEARNERS continued

ACTIVITY 5:

**activity5_securityreport_[Registration
number #]_[surname]_[first letter of first name]**

**You must complete an authentication sheet before you
hand your work in to your invigilator.**

SET TASK BRIEF

THE EIGHTIES HOTEL

Peter Okdekaj is the owner of a hotel chain, Okdekaj Hotels Group (OHG). Each hotel is themed on different historical periods, e.g. Edwardian or Victorian.

Peter has recently purchased another building that he is going to develop into a hotel themed on the 1980s.

The building was constructed in 1985. It is a six–floor apartment block. There is a shopping arcade on the ground floor, an underground car park and five accommodation floors. The original facade and car park will be kept, and the apartments will be converted to hotel rooms. The ground floor shopping arcade will be made into offices, a reception area, a restaurant, and other public amenities.

(continued on the next page)

SET TASK BRIEF continued

In keeping with the Eighties theme:

- **no wireless communication is available in the hotel except for short range systems required for contactless payments**
- **each guest room has an entertainment centre that provides 1980s films, music, TV programmes and computer facilities.**

As WiFi and the internet were not available before the 1990s, there will not be any guest WiFi in the hotel and the internet will only be available through guests' own devices.

The 1980s computer facilities are supplied by virtual machines running on a dedicated server. These virtual machines emulate IBM compatible 386 machines from 1986. They would have been high end, home PCs at the time.

(continued on the next page)

SET TASK BRIEF continued

The operating system is Microsoft Disk Operating System (MS–DOS) version 3.2

MS–DOS 3.2 uses a command line interface and was introduced in 1986.

It allows networking and supports 3.5–inch, 720 KB floppy drives.

Peter has many years of experience in hotel management but thinks of himself as an IT user rather than an IT specialist. He relies on OHG’s IT staff to run the network.

CLIENT BRIEF

You advised Peter on cyber security matters when the hotel was being planned. Now, a few months later, he has asked you to review the investigation of a cyber security incident.

The incident occurred during the first weekend in May.

(continued on the next page)

SET TASK BRIEF continued

A guest reported that the computer in their entertainment system had done something peculiar. The text in the MS –DOS interface had suddenly started to drop letters to the bottom of the screen. When everything had fallen, the message “Hello from 1988. Your computer is now infected.” appeared.

The duty technician realised that this was a potential system breach and started an incident report.

EVIDENCE ITEMS FROM THE SECURITY INCIDENT AT OHG’S EIGHTIES HOTEL

Evidence items include:

- 1. Network Manager’s report (17 – 23)**
- 2. Virus history (24 – 25)**
- 3. Files used in the emulated 386 machine (26)**
- 4. Network diagram (27)**
- 5. Addendum to Network Manager’s report (28 – 29)**
- 6. Cyber security document – incident management policy. (30 – 35)**

(continued on the next page)

Turn over

EVIDENCE ITEM 1 – NETWORK MANAGER’S REPORT

Sun. 7th May. 2023. 17:00

Hennrick Bello: Network Manager, Eighties Hotel: OHG

Cyber security incident report.

Incident Number 20230052

TEAM MEMBERS

Hennrick Bello: Network Manager

Jade Rolle: Deputy Network Manager (senior on site technician)

SITUATION

Jade Rolle, our Deputy Network Manager was on duty on Saturday 6th May. She responded to a guest report, logged at 18.36, that the 1980s computer was behaving strangely.

(continued on the next page)

EVIDENCE ITEM 1 continued

The guest reported that they had been logged in and had the **GAME** directory showing when the text started to fall down the screen and accumulate at the bottom. This took about thirty seconds to empty the screen. A message was then displayed saying

“Hello from 1988. Your computer is now infected”

Jade visited the guest’s room and confirmed that the message was as described.

The computer would not react to the keyboard until Jade used ctrl–alt–del to try and stop whatever was causing the effect. The computer then returned to normal operation, showing the Command Prompt **C:\GAME>_**

The guest stated that they had been playing the games but had not touched any of the other applications.

Jade made a copy of the files that might have been used by the guest. (SEE EVIDENCE ITEM 3). She also cloned the virtual machine in its current state for further investigation.

(continued on the next page)

EVIDENCE ITEM 1 continued

Further use of the computer failed to recreate the falling text effect.

There had been no other reports from guests of anything similar.

Jade performed an internet search for “Hello from 1988. Your computer is now infected”. An exact match was not found but a similar message was associated with the Stoned virus.

Further searching showed that the falling text behaviour was associated with the Cascade virus. Both Stoned and Cascade are 1980’s viruses.

**Jade compiled some notes about them for reference.
(SEE EVIDENCE ITEM 2)**

Jade thought that the incident was unusual so she telephoned me at 19:40 to discuss the matter.

With no further incidents being reported and a simple fix via ctrl–alt–del, I told her to log the incident as minor but said we’d activate the Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) and would look at it further the next day.

(continued on the next page)

Turn over

EVIDENCE ITEM 1 continued

I logged the activation of the CSIRT at 19:45 on Sat 6th May.

THE INVESTIGATION

The CSIRT met at 09:00 on Sun 7th May to consider the incident.

Team members present; Hennrick Bello: Team Leader, Jade Rolle: Deputy Network Manager.

The team determined that there was no possibility that guest or company data could have been compromised, and no further team members needed to be co-opted at that stage.

Material available:

- **Preliminary notes.**
- **Copy of files (SEE EVIDENCE ITEM 3)**

Cloned virtual machine.

On reading Jade's notes about the Stoned and Cascade viruses, it was obvious that the incident could not have been caused by one of/a combination of them. The team therefore looked at other possibilities.

(continued on the next page)

Turn over

EVIDENCE ITEM 1 continued

- 1. An infection brought in by the guest.**
 - 2. An infection in the files used by the virtual machine server.**
 - 3. An undocumented feature in one of the pieces of 1980's software.**
-
- 1. Was rejected as the guest did not have a floppy disk and had not asked for an adaptor to use with an SD card.**
 - 2. Was checked by running an anti-malware scan on the files. Nothing was detected. Specific checks for signatures of Stoned and Cascade were also negative.**
 - 3. This remains a possibility but is difficult to prove/disprove based on a single incident. An internet search did not produce any similar situations.**

The team looked at the game files that had been used (SEE EVIDENCE ITEM 3). On the assumption that the Cascade part was mimicking the original virus, it was deemed very unlikely that a game was involved.

(continued on the next page)

EVIDENCE ITEM 1 continued

The team looked at the DOS files being used. Nothing obvious was seen and it appeared that the only way to check would be to try all the possible DOS commands to see if any were broken. This proved ineffectual as several commands could not work in the virtual environment.

The team then downloaded some other copies of DOS 3.2 from the internet in order to match files against the ones present. This was also ineffectual as, at that time (1980s), each manufacturer seemed to have its own version of DOS. Sometimes different versions, for each model of computer. In addition, while the file sizes in different versions were often the same, this was not always the case.

The cloned virtual machine was then investigated but no actions by the team could replicate the event.

(continued on the next page)

EVIDENCE ITEM 1 continued

CONCLUSIONS

In the absence of anti-malware results or further similar incidents, no firm conclusion could be reached.

REMEDIAL ACTION

As a precaution, all files for DOS 3.2 games, and other applications were replaced with versions downloaded from different sources.

The incident was closed at 17:00 Sun 7th May.

ADDENDUM TO NETWORK MANAGER'S REPORT

An unofficial investigation into the possibility of an undocumented feature was conducted.

(SEE EVIDENCE ITEM 5)

EVIDENCE ITEM 2 – VIRUS HISTORY

STONED VIRUS

- **Invented in New Zealand in 1987, became distributed worldwide in 1988.**
- **Boot sector virus, carried by floppy disks.**
- **Infects the master boot sector of the hard disk.**
- **Only tries infecting other floppy disks when the floppy drive is running.**
- **Tests the boot sector for infection and does not attempt to access infected disks.**
- **Prints a message depending on the value of one bit in the computer's internal clock. One in eight chance of appearing.**
- **No other effects on the running of the computer.**

(continued on the next page)

EVIDENCE ITEM 2 continued**CASCADE VIRUS**

- Invented in Germany in 1987, became distributed worldwide in 1988.
 - Infects .COM files by changing the first three bytes of the .COM file code to point to the virus file.
The file length remains the same, making detection more difficult.
 - When an infected .COM file is run, Cascade moves into memory and becomes resident.
 - The resident virus will infect other .COM files as they are run.
 - Cascade causes the characters on a DOS screen to randomly cascade to the bottom of the screen to form a pile of numbers and letters.
 - The file that causes the cascade behaviour is runnable and will be .EXE .COM or .SYS. It may hide by replacing a genuine file.
 - It was originally written to execute when an infected file is run between October 1 and December 31 in 1988.
-

EVIDENCE ITEM 3 – FILES USED IN THE EMULATED 386 MACHINE

Files in C:\DOS>

Look at Table 1 and Table 2 for EVIDENCE ITEM 3 in the separate Data Book. The version used in the Eighties Hotel is shown in the first column, an IBM DOS written for a generic 386 machine. The other columns show versions of DOS written for three other computer manufacturers.

Files in C:\GAMES>

Look at Table 3 for EVIDENCE ITEM 3 in the separate Data Book. Files for the games played by the guest prior to the Stoned/Cascade event.

All the games worked correctly when tested after the event.

EVIDENCE ITEM 4 – NETWORK DIAGRAM

**Look at the Network diagram for EVIDENCE ITEM 4
in the separate Data Book.**

EVIDENCE ITEM 5 – ADDENDUM TO NETWORK MANAGER’S REPORT

Sat. 13th May. 2023

Re: Cyber security incident report.

Incident Number 20230052

Following the closure of the incident on 7th May 2023, I told my daughter, Adele, about the incident. She is studying for a Computer Science degree. She asked if she could have a look at the preserved files. OHG agreed so I gave her a copy.

Adele installed an emulator on her laptop. She then ran numerous scenarios to try and replicate the event.

A breakthrough came after she left her laptop unattended for a while. On her return “Hello from 1988. Your computer is now infected.” was displayed.

Adele hypothesised that the behaviour required a timed interval of inactivity. She set up several virtual machines and tried to replicate the event again.

(continued on the next page)

Turn over

EVIDENCE ITEM 5 continued

RESULTS

1. The waiting period was exactly 33 minutes 8 seconds.
2. It did not matter which games or other applications, if any, were used before the inactivity.
3. The event only happened in about 10% of the trials.

CONCLUSIONS

Adele thinks that the only way to solve the problem would be to disassemble all the files into their original assembly language and see which contains the code for the message.

EVIDENCE ITEM 6 – CYBER SECURITY DOCUMENT – INCIDENT MANAGEMENT POLICY

INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TEAM

**The Computer Security Incident Response Team
(CSIRT) shall consist of:**

- **The Network Manager at the Eighties Hotel
(Team Leader)**
- **The Senior Technician present at the time
of the incident.**

**If the Team Leader suspects that customer data may
have been compromised, representatives of the OHG
Legal and Public Relations teams shall be co-opted.**

**The Team Leader shall co-opt other team members
as needed.**

(continued on the next page)

EVIDENCE ITEM 6 continued

INCIDENT REPORTING

Any member of staff who considers that an IT–related security incident has occurred must report it as soon as possible to the Team Leader.

Initially it may be reported verbally but this must be followed up by an email. It is the responsibility of the CSIRT to maintain detailed documentation on the incident from first report to final resolution.

Security incidents may include:

- **theft of IT equipment**
- **theft of company data**
- **unauthorised access to the Eighties Hotel systems**
- **infection of the Eighties Hotel systems with malware.**

(continued on the next page)

EVIDENCE ITEM 6 continued

INCIDENT RESPONSE PROCEDURES

(a) THEFT OF IT EQUIPMENT

- Theft of IT equipment is a very serious issue. Any thefts must be reported at once to the CSIRT Leader, initially a verbal report must be made followed up by email, providing as much information as possible (location and type of equipment, when it was last seen etc.).
- The CSIRT Leader must ascertain if the item has actually been stolen (or if it is just missing).
- If the item is confirmed as stolen, the CSIRT Leader must inform OHG finance department so they can inform insurers.
- The CSIRT must prepare a report on the theft for the Eighties Hotel Manager, and if needed justify the finances required to replace the stolen item.

(continued on the next page)

EVIDENCE ITEM 6 continued

(b) THEFT OF DATA

- Theft or loss of data may occur in a number of different ways.
- Any loss of data must be reported at once to the CSIRT Leader, initially a verbal report must be made followed up by email.
- The CSIRT must investigate the loss and identify exactly what data has been lost or stolen and when the incident occurred.
- Where it is suspected that customers' personally identifiable information has been accessed, a report must be made to the Eighties Hotel Manager, who will then report to OHG HQ.
- Having identified what has been lost or stolen, and when, the CSIRT must retrieve backups and restore the data as soon as possible.
- The CSIRT should review the incident and implement procedures to prevent future losses.

(continued on the next page)

Turn over

EVIDENCE ITEM 6 continued

(c) INFECTION OF IT SYSTEMS WITH MALWARE

- Any member of staff who suspects that any system has been infected with malware must report at once to the CSIRT Leader, initially a verbal report must be made followed up by email.
- The infected system should be shut down as soon as possible
- The CSIRT will investigate the infection and take appropriate measures to resolve the infection and restore the system.

(continued on the next page)

EVIDENCE ITEM 6 continued

(d) UNAUTHORISED ACCESS TO SYSTEMS

- Any member of staff who suspects that there has been unauthorised access to any system must report it at once to the CSIRT Leader, providing as much detail as possible (which system, how access was obtained). Initially a verbal report must be made, followed up by email.
 - The CSIRT will thoroughly investigate the incident and identify how the unauthorised access was obtained.
 - The CSIRT will take whatever action is required to prevent future occurrences (e.g. change passwords).
-

Part B Set Task

You must complete ALL activities within the set task.

Produce your documents using a computer.

Save your documents in your folder ready for submission using the formats and naming conventions indicated.

Read the set task brief carefully before you begin and note that reading time is included in the overall assessment time.

You have been advising Peter Okdekaj on cyber security. Now he has asked you to review the investigation of a cyber security incident.

ACTIVITY 4: FORENSIC INCIDENT ANALYSIS – You are advised to spend 2 hours on this activity.

Analyse the forensic evidence, including how the evidence was obtained, for the cyber security incident at OHG's Eighties Hotel.

Consider possible causes of the incident and come to a conclusion about the most likely cause of the incident.

Refer to evidence items 1 – 5 inclusive.

Produce a forensic incident analysis using the template Forensic_Analysis.rtf

Save your completed forensic incident analysis as a PDF in your folder for submission as activity4_incidentanalysis_[Registration number #]_[surname]_[first letter of first name]

(Total for Activity 4 = 14 marks)

ACTIVITY 5: SECURITY REPORT – You are advised to spend 2 hours on this activity.

Review the incident. Suggest improvements and explain how they would prevent a similar incident in the future.

Areas for improvement are:

- **adherence to forensic procedures**
- **the forensic procedure and current security protection measures**
- **the security documentation.**

Read the set task brief and evidence items 1 – 6 inclusive when answering the question.

**Save your completed security report as a PDF in your folder for submission as
activity5_securityreport_[Registration
number #]_[surname]_[first letter of first name]**

(Total for Activity 5 = 20 marks)

**TOTAL FOR TECHNICAL LANGUAGE
IN PART B = 3 MARKS**

TOTAL FOR PART B = 37 MARKS

END OF PAPER
